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ABSTRACT: In modern Anglo-European philosophy there is a distinct progression from the metaphysical 
realism of ancient and classical philosophy towards a type of scepticism that eventually leads towards 
nihilism. Interestingly this progression also appears in the doctrines of the Classical schools of Indian 
Buddhism that pre-date modern European philosophy by well over six centuries. This progression stems 
from the application of the same types of logical and philosophical reasoning to the problems of 
metaphysics. The movement from metaphysical realism to representationalism to idealism and finally 
towards nihilism, which is seen within both the classical Indian Buddhist tradition and Modern Anglo-
European philosophy, are products of a coherent and wholly logical progression from the acceptance of 
certain metaphysical principles. The fact that these same movements occur in two philosophical traditions 
that are separated by vast chasms in space, time and culture seems to point to an underlying commonality 
underlying human philosophical enquiry, whether this is a result of a common intelligible reality, an essential 
and universal human nature or both is a philosophical question we must continue to pursue.  
In  studying  modern  Anglo-European  philosophy,  one  cannot  help  but  notice  the
progression from the metaphysical realism in ancient and classical philosophy towards a
type of scepticism that eventually ends in nihilism. This progression also appears in the
doctrines of the Classical  schools of  Indian Buddhism that pre-date modern European
philosophy. This progression stems from the application of the same types of logical and
philosophical reasoning to the problems of metaphysics and this is indicative of a common
pattern in human reasoning that transcends cultures and religions.
The most  interesting problem of  metaphysics arose among the  ancient  Greeks in  the
respective visions of Parmenides and Heraclitus.  The works of Heraclitus exemplify the
empirical world of sensation and change while the thought of Parmenides exemplifies the
abstract and intelligible world of continuous theoretical unity. Heraclitus postulates a world
of perpetual flux in which  men are capable of directly perceiving things as they are in
reality, although they generally fail to attain this perception (Kirk, 1954 pp. 55-56, 376).  In
contrast,  Parmenides  postulates  a  world  of  universal  stasis  in  which  all  changes  are
merely  illusory,  while  the  true  and  absolute  reality  is  unitary,  indivisible,  timeless  and
unchangeable and can only be known through the intellect [435] (Coxon, 2009 p. 64). The
illusory nature of change is also at the root of the paradoxes of Zeno, who was himself a
student of Parmenides (Coxon, 2009 pp. 389-399). If  it can be said that the European
philosophical tradition “consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead, 1978 p.39), it
can be further stated that much of the work from Plato onward, especially the work of
Plato's  pupil  Aristotle  in  Physics  (Sachs,  1995  pp.  34-35,  41,  43)  was  essentially  an
attempt to answer Heraclitus and Parmenides. 
The same problem emerges in early Indian philosophy with the  interaction between the
predecessors  of  the  orthodox  Ãstika schools  of  Hinduism and  the  heterodox  Nāstika
traditions of the śraman -a schools. The texts of the Buddhists and the Jains attest to the
interactions between their followers and those of other śraman -a traditions, as personified
by the six heretics in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (D.i.47) of the Buddhist Pāli Canon. This
interaction  between  schools  in  India  is  best  exemplified  by  examining  the  differences
between  orthodox  Brahmanism  (the  predecessors  of  contemporary  Hinduism)  and
heterodox Buddhism. One can clearly see that this interaction parallels that of Parmenides
and Heraclitus in a philosophical sense, as orthodox Brahmanism was heavily influenced
by the Upanis Eadic account of the one eternal and immutable cosmic principle and ground
of being, Brahman; while the followers of the Buddha denied the existence of Brahman or
any other permanent, immutable and substantial entity. 
The main driver of philosophical speculation between the ancient Greeks and the ancient
philosophers of India was to explain the unified theoretical intelligibility of things with the
empirical fact of unceasing change. For the monists of both traditions, all was ultimately an
immutable one, while the pluralists offered an account of universal flux. However, what
was undisputed by any party in the earliest philosophical speculation was the reality of the
world.  It  is  often  said  that  nobody  doubted  the  existence  of  the  external  world  until
Descartes proved it existed in the sixth meditation. We will see that this is not really the
case,  but  there  is  more  to  the  statement  than  a  witty  observation.  Although  both
Brahmanism and Buddhism believed that one's knowledge, experience and perception of
the absolute (as Brahman or nibbāna) was hindered by the effects of delusion and illusion,
neither  denied the  reality  of  the external  world  in  their  first  formulations.  In  fact,  both
schools,  as well  as the majority  of  the ancient  Greeks shared a belief  in  an eternally
existing, uncreated and very real universe. 
In the European tradition, the father of classical metaphysics, Aristotle, used a theory of
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metaphysical substance to solve the metaphysical problems of unity and plurality, being
and becoming. His insight lasted for a considerable length of time, being further developed
throughout the Middle Ages and serving as a foundation for metaphysical thought in the
Anglo-European tradition up to the present day. This metaphysical framework unified the
empirical experience of plurality in the functioning of one infinite intellect that acts as the
first  cause,  the  unmoved  mover  and  ultimate  ground  of  being.  This  solution  was  so
fundamentally brilliant that the essentials of Aristotle's metaphysical framework were not
seriously challenged until the modern era.
Early  Buddhist  philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  was  explicitly  non-substantial  from the
earliest  teachings  of  the  Buddha  who  made it  clear  that  concepts  can  mistakenly  be
endowed  with  a  substantial  identity  by  assigning  them  an  intrinsic  and  independent
existence  in  the  linguistic  [436]  processes  (Inada,  1988  p.  262)  of  categorising  and
naming.  Buddhism  also  depended  on  a  very  different  view  of  causality  than  that  of
Aristotle.  The  Buddhist  principle  of  causality  is  known  as  dependent  origination
(pat -iccasamuppāda) and it is a doctrine of interdependent and pluralist causality that is
abstractly formulated in the discourses by way of the formula “This arising, that arises; this
ceasing, that ceases” (A.v.185; M.i.263-263; M.ii.32; M.iii.63; Sii.28; S.ii.65; S.ii.70). This
abstract formulation of dependent origination as a general causal principle means that all
phenomena in all possible realms, mental and physical, arise and cease in relation to other
phenomena and in dependence upon their conditions. 
The Buddha illustrates this dependence with the example of two bundles of reeds stood up
and leaning against each other so that each supports the other. One cannot say that either
bundle caused the other bundle or the aggregation of the two standing bundles to exist.
However,  the  aggregation  of  the  two bundles  only  continues to  stand so  long as  the
bundles of reeds are dependent upon and supporting each other. If one bundle is taken
away, the other falls as well. In the same way, aggregates of the human personality such
as consciousness and the other immaterial aggregates (nāma) are dependent upon and
conditioned  by  the  aggregate  of  materiality  (rūpa)  and  the  presence  of  the  entire
psychophysical entity (nāmarūpa) involves the arising of mind and materiality together in
absolute  dependence  upon  each  other  (S.ii.114).  All  of  the  factors  in  a  causal  chain
mutually condition each other and provide the support necessary for each factor to arise in
succession.
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  early  Buddhist  metaphysics  differs  substantially  from  that  of
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Aristotle and his successors, the early Buddhists also accepted the reality of the world as a
given. While it is true that Buddhist philosophy puts great emphasis on one's subjective
experience of the phenomenal world, this should not be taken to imply that there is no real
world to be experienced. This is especially true given the differences between how an
unenlightened being and an enlightened being experience the same world and the fact
that the early Buddhist texts have nothing explicit to say about putting forth any type of
systematic ontology. What is found in the early texts seems to indicate that the dominant
ontological  perspective  of  early  Buddhism was a type of  realism in  regard to  things /
events as existing independently of the mind. For example, the  conditioning of contact
(phassa) via the sense faculties involves contact with something that is externally existent.
According to the doctrine of dependent origination, the existent cannot have independent
existence  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  known  intrinsically  by  way  of  any  essence  or
substance. However, this does not entail that a dependently originated existent or event is
somehow unreal or that their reality is dependent on being subjectively perceived. Indeed,
the  very  idea  of  attaining  salvation  in  Buddhism  by  “seeing  things  as  they  are”
(yathābhūtam-) means that by removing one's subjective ignorance it is possible for one to
perceive the existents  as they are in  reality.  The Buddha also  says that  truth  is  one,
implying that the liberating truth of the Buddhist teaching and cosmic order (dhamma) is
singular, objective and real (Sn. 888). Lastly, even if all that is conditioned is impermanent,
changeable and somehow unreal; the liberated state (nibbāna) as taught by the Buddha is
unconditioned,  immutable  and  imperishable  and  therefore  must  be  real  in  some  very
important sense. The Buddha also teaches that he does not dispute with the world about
what exists and what does not exist.  Instead, he agrees with the wise about the [437]
existence of impermanent, suffering and ever-changing aggregates and he also agrees
with the wise about the non-existence of permanent, eternal and unchanging aggregates
(S.iii.138-139). 
Early  Buddhist  realism was exemplified  by  the  Sarvāstivādins  and persisted  in  Indian
Buddhism for  centuries.  However,  it  was strongly  challenged  during  the  period  of  the
Abhidhamma and  Buddhist  Scholasticism.  The  Abhidhamma,  a  systematisation  of
Buddhist philosophy that emerged a few centuries after the passing of the Buddha, tended
to use a methodical form of logical reductionism in which phenomena were reduced to
dhammas, conceived of as the smallest  perceptual  building blocks of  experience,  and
there  was  a  tendency  to  reconstruct  them as  discrete  and  atomistic  ultimate  entities
(paramattha-dhamma).  The same logical  reductionism applied to phenomena was also
applied to time and temporality and this gave rise to a theory of momentariness in which
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time  consists  of  atomistic  and  discrete  moments  in  succession.  The  atomistic
momentariness of time was ultimately coupled with the conception of  dhammas to form
discrete time-moments, or point-instants. This conception of time created logical problems
with the concept of direct perception of the external world and with the concept of causality
as the momentary  dhamma as a point-instant could not be said to endure over time to
condition the successive dhammas that arise following each dhamma’s cessation without
granting dhammas some form of substantiality or essence. 
This led to the Buddhist realist schools to formulate a theory in which the dhammas exist in
some way in the past, present and future. However, this was challenged by other schools
who saw it, with some justification, as a theory of metaphysical substance that could be
said to contradict the Buddhist doctrine of the impermanence of all things (anicca). This
attempt to avoid essentialism while accepting a theory of time as discrete moments led the
Sautrāntika  school  of  Buddhism  to  commit  to  a  radical  form  presentism  and
representationalism. This split between the Buddhist realists of the Sarvāstivādin school
and the representationalist Sautrāntika school represents the same type of move away
from metaphysical realism that would occur centuries later in the European tradition for
similar reasons.
Although  Descartes  is  considered  the  father  of  modern  philosophy  in  the  European
tradition, his theory of substance dualism is unlike anything found in any other type of
philosophy known to the author.  This is likely due to his emphasis on rationalism and
desire for philosophical knowledge that equals the certainty of mathematical knowledge.
However, a very similar movement towards representationalism is found among the British
empiricists, likely because Buddhism is also primarily a form of empiricism, and this is
evident in the philosophy of John Locke. Like the Buddhists, Locke (1690) sees the danger
of reifying concepts in the linguistic process of naming things (p. 380). Locke  seems to
accept the possibility of metaphysical substance but does not consider it to be intelligible
or  in  conformity  with  the  real  experience  of  indeterminate  particulars  (p.  404).  While
particulars  seem  to  have  mind-independent  existence,  one's  relationship  to  these
particulars is wholly mind-dependent and representational. 
[438]  Once  this  move  towards  representationalism is  embraced,  it  is  logical  to  move
towards a type of idealism. An example of this development occurs in the work of Bishop
Berkeley in the Anglo-European tradition and in the development of Yogācāra Buddhism
with its emphasis on reality as consisting of mind. In both cases, the experience of things
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is accepted, but their ultimate existence is said to dependent upon being perceived by
minds.  The reality  of  the object itself  is  intertwined with its  mental  representation. For
Berkeley, the existence of God as the omni-present perceiver of all things gives his theory
substantial explanatory power and further serves to validate the growing separation of the
mental from the physical and the privileging of the former over the latter.  In the Buddhist
tradition, idealism led to an emphasis on fleeting conscious experiences of perceptions
and mental events as constructing the entirety of human existence. The fact that the mind
is restless and jumps from thought to thought rapidly also served to reinforce further the
atomisation of time brought about by the theory of moments. 
The atomisation of time is a major factor in the work of the sceptic David Hume. Like the
Buddhists, Hume (1748) sees causality as the key that allows human beings to go beyond
the evidence of  memory or  the senses by way of  inference (p.  542).  However,  Hume
argues that causality is an inference ultimately based on no more than one's experience of
a constant conjunction between causes and their effects, and contends that one can never
actually  experience causality itself  (p.  544).  Given this,  he argues that  any attempt to
argue for the existence of an intelligible causal principle will be circular (p. 545). 
Hume is unknowingly following his predecessors in Buddhism by conflating discrete and
momentary mental representations with the ontological reality of things and the empirical
experience  of  time.  This  causes  Hume to  encounter  the  same  difficulty  in  explaining
continuity  and causality  between atomistic  point-instants  and he responds logically  by
giving up on the idea of causality itself.  The Buddhists were able to save their theory of
causality from this effect only because dependent origination is radically different than that
put  forth  in  the  Aristotelian  tradition  of  the  Anglo-Europeans.  However,  the  Buddhist
representationalists and idealists end up in agreement with Hume about the non-existence
of substance and the absence of a substantial and permanent self.
It  is  the work of  Hume that  leads Anglo-European philosophy towards its  “Copernican
Revolution”  in  the  work  of  Immanuel  Kant.  Kant  (1783)  accepts  Hume's  claim  that
principles of metaphysical cognition like causality cannot be empirical (p. 665). However,
Kant proposes that they must be beyond experience by way of an a priori synthetic type of
metaphysical  cognition,  because  analytic  judgements  are  a  priori even  when  derived
empirically due to the fact that they are tautological  and can be judged purely on the
grounds of contradiction or non-contradiction. Kant then argues that synthetic judgements
are always judgements of experience. Given this, Kant says that the essential subject of
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metaphysics is to determine how synthetic a priori cognitions are generated (p. 668). Kant
believes that he solves this problem by reversing Hume's argument and making subjective
experience dependent upon a priori concepts rather than trying to derive these concepts
from subjective experience (p. 688).
[439] While these a priori concepts are said to be ideal for Kant, his system is not 
completely idealistic in that he does not deny the ontological reality of outside objects, only
our ability to know them through the senses as they are in themselves (p. 677). Instead, 
what is known perceptually must be subsumed under these a priori concepts of the 
understanding in order to make the judgements of perception into universally valid 
judgements of experience (p. 682). In this theory, experience consists of cognitions which 
belong to sensibility, while judgements apply to the faculty of understanding. The senses 
intuit while understanding thinks by unifying the representations in the consciousness, 
which is itself a type of judgement. These subjective, individual and possible ways of 
unifying representations in consciousness and subjective judgements function as pure 
concepts of understanding that are the principles upon which objective judgements are 
constructed. These principles of possible experience are at the same time universal laws 
of nature in that they serve as the foundation upon which to build the logical system of 
natural science (Kant, 1783 p. 684).
Kant claims that reason oversteps its bounds when it searches for the noumena beyond 
experience and produces illusions of transcendent use that are unbound from experience. 
The ideas of pure reason are completely determined and impel one to look for an ultimate 
substance that can never be obtained in experience and tends to lead one into the error of 
reifying phenomena (p. 697). As an example of this, Kant also views the self not as an 
absolute subject like most people mistakenly believe, but as the fact of bare awareness 
that cannot in itself be predicated of anything substantial. Instead, the self is only the 
relation of inner appearances to the phenomenal objects of apperception (p. 698). 
As we have seen, this idea that there is no substantial self is also found in Hume and is 
one of the three conditions of existence for the Buddhist. This serves to bolster the 
strength of our comparison of the divergence from metaphysical realism in classical Indian 
Buddhism and Modern Anglo-European philosophy. In both cases the movement towards 
idealism / phenomenalism is inevitably preceded by movement towards 
representationalism on the part of earlier philosophers. From this representationalist 
stance, idealism enters the discourse and the move towards idealism and emphasis on the
role of the mind feeds into a reductionist view of time as made up of discrete atomistic 
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point-instants of inner experience. As soon as time is divided into infinitesimals, or 
durationless durations, it becomes difficult to account for causal forces acting across 
contiguous and discrete moments of time.  
Unlike the Buddhists (with the exception of the Sarvāstivādins), Kant also took space to be
something that could not be experienced. This is because he viewed space as a 
Newtonian container into which objects were put, leaving space as a negative relation 
between objects. This means that Kant assigns the the self as subject, causality, space 
and time to the mental realm of ideas of pure reason rather than regarding them as 
substantial empirical existents. Since these concepts cannot be experienced and nothing 
can be shown to exist outside of experience, Kant ultimately finds himself in the same 
position as the Buddhists who were forced to refer to dhammas  as the ultimate entities 
constituting reality while at the same time trying to deny these ultimate entities any type of 
substantial or mind-independent reality. 
[440] Kant made a valiant effort to save philosophy from the threat posed by natural 
science and mechanistic physics, but in sacrificing metaphysics and drawing a distinction 
between noumena and phenomena he could not stop the inexorable advance of 
scepticism towards nihilism that appears to follow from the movement away from 
metaphysical realism and the resulting ascendency of the mental over the physical. The 
culmination of this movement is best exemplified by Nāgārjuna in the Buddhist tradition 
and Nietzsche in the Anglo-European tradition. 
Nietzsche sees the world as being emptied of objective meaning as philosophers come to 
understand that the world is a continual process of becoming devoid of being. For 
Nietzsche, the concept of being is a lie that previous philosophers told themselves to avoid
facing the aimless, unintelligible and empty process of becoming. Being is merely a mental
representation which tries to capture and pervert the process of becoming. In a world of 
perpetual becoming in which being is a lie, the world is empty of meaning and value and it 
is left to the individual being to create one's own value in this world. Nietzsche believes 
that philosophy has served as a way of creating meaning, in much the same way as 
religion, but ultimately the will to truth in philosophy inevitably undermines itself with its 
discovery that there is no ultimate truth. For Nietzsche, this dilemma causes one to either 
retreat into the life-denying asceticism of the will to nothingness or to advance in the life-
affirming activity of the will to power.    
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In the Buddhist tradition Nāgārjuna reacted to the scholastic systematising of the 
Abhidhamma by following the logic of non-substantiality to its ultimate conclusion in regard
to the dhammas. If a dhamma was the ultimate entity of experience while itself possessing
no intrinsic existence (independent, non-dependently originated existence), then the true 
“essence” of dhammas and all of conditioned reality is void or “emptiness” (suññatā). In 
this Nāgārjuna was adopting an explicitly anti-metaphysical stance and he uses dialectic 
and the tetralemma of Indian logic to negate all dependently originated existence. The 
impact of this form of metaphysical nihilism is buffered by the presence of Buddhist 
soteriology as well as the Buddhist teaching of the middle path, by way of which 
Nāgārjuna's teaching can be seen as denying both existence and non-existence and 
forging a middle path between extreme views of eternalism and annihilationism. Yet it 
bears many metaphysical and existential similarities to the philosophy of Nietzsche and his
contemporary successors. Furthermore, given the perspective of early Buddhism it is 
unlikely that Nāgārjuna could have made the logical movement towards emptiness without 
the prior acceptance of momentariness and representationalism on the part of his 
predecessors. 
Thus it becomes clear that the movements seen within the classical Indian Buddhist 
tradition and Modern Anglo-European philosophy are products of a coherent and wholly 
logical progression from the acceptance of certain metaphysical principles. The fact that 
these same movements occur in two philosophical traditions that are separated by vast 
chasms in space, time and culture seems to point to an underlying commonality underlying
human philosophical enquiry, whether this is a result of a common intelligible reality, an 
essential and universal human nature or both is a philosophical question we must continue
to pursue.  
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